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HAROLD B. WILLEY, Cl

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1955

No. 905

LEONARD J. SHAFITZ,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

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INDEX

	Page
Opinion Below	2
Statement of Grounds of Jurisdiction	2
Questions Presented for Review	2-3
Constitutional Provision, Statute and Court Rule Involved	4
Statement of the Case	4-8
Reasons for Granting the Writ	8-13
Conclusion	13
Appendix A—Order affirming judgment	1a
Appendix B—Full text of 18 U. S. C. Sec. 1341	2a

TABLE OF CASES CITED

Anderson v. United States, 6 Cir., 215 F. 2d 84	9
Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78	13
Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494	11
Griffin v. United States, 6 Cir., 173 F. 2d 909	10
Kann v. United States, 323 U. S. 88	11
New York Central v. Johnson, 279 U. S. 310	13
Pereira v. United States, 347 U. S. 1	7, 10
Pullen v. United States, 5 Cir., 164 F. 2d 756	10
Schultz v. United States, 9 Cir., 155 F. 2d 721	9
Spillers v. United States, 5 Cir., 47 F. 2d 893	11
Spurr v. United States, 174 U. S. 728	11
Sutton v. United States, 5 Cir., 157 F. 2d 661	10
United States v. Amorosa, 3 Cir., 167 F. 2d 596	9
United States v. Max, 3 Cir., 156 F. 2d 13	8
United States v. Taylor, 2 Cir., 217 F. 2d 397	11
United States v. Trypuc, 2 Cir., 136 F. 2d 900	8
Vierick v. United States, 318 U. S. 236	13

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES, COURT RULE AND MISCELLANEOUS

	Page
Constitution of the United States:	
Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause	4
18 U. S. C., Sec. 2	12
18 U. S. C., Sec. 1341	1, 4
18 U. S. C., Sec. 1503	9
28 U. S. C., Sec. 1254	2
Rule 7 (c), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure	4, 9
Department of Justice, Bulletin, Vol. I, May 27, 1946, No. 14	9
Form 3—Indictment for Mail Fraud, 18 U. S. C., pp. 2560, 2561	11

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To the Chief Justice of the United States and the Associate Justices of the United States Supreme Court:

Petitioner respectfully asks this Court to issue a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirming a judgment of the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville upon a jury verdict finding petitioner guilty upon a ten count indictment charging use of the mails to defraud in violation of 18 U. S. C. §1341.

OPINION BELOW

Affirmance of petitioner's conviction was by order. No printed opinion was filed. A copy of the order of affirmance is hereto attached as Appendix A.

STATEMENT OF GROUNDS OF JURISDICTION

1. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was rendered February 28, 1956.

8. Timely application for rehearing was made, which was denied March 30, 1956.

3. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to the provisions of 28 U. S. C. §1254.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. The indictment charged that petitioner and another "placed or caused to be placed in an authorized depository for mail matter" certain allegedly fraudulent invoices. There was no proof either defendant *placed* the invoices in any authorized depository. Conviction was sustained on the ground that defendants *caused* the invoices to be delivered by mail, and that it was not necessary for the indictment to charge that they did so "knowingly."

Under the circumstances, was the indictment fatally defective in failing to charge an essential element of the statutory offense: viz., that defendant "knowingly" caused the invoices to be delivered by mail?

2. The indictment charged use of the mails between Louisville, Kentucky and Richmond, Virginia. The trial court permitted the jury to consider testimony concerning the mailing of checks from Richmond to New York City, stating in the presence of the jury on objection thereto: "I don't think that's a fatal variance." The trial court refused to charge that the jury must find use of the mails between Louisville and Richmond as charged in the indictment, holding that "the words of the indictment charging only the use of the mail between Louisville and Richmond is superfluous and not an essential part of the charge."

Did the foregoing rulings deprive petitioner of his constitutional right to a fair trial upon the specific charges in the indictment?

3. In his closing argument to the jury, the United States Attorney advised the jury that there was no doubt in his mind about the guilt of defendants, and implored the jury "from the bottom of my heart and with all my sincerity and honesty that I ever had, to render a verdict quickly and swiftly of guilty."

Did this conduct on the part of the United States Attorney deprive petitioner of a fair trial?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTE AND COURT RULE INVOLVED

The constitutional provision involved is the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment: "No person shall • • • be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

The statute is the mail fraud statute (18 U. S. C. §1341) which, in pertinent part, provides:

> "Whoever, having devised • • • any scheme • • • to defraud, or for obtaining money • • • by means of false • • • pretenses • • • for the purpose of executing such scheme • • • places in any Post Office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Post Office Department • • • or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon • • • any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both."

The court rule involved is Rule 7 (c), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (18 U. S. C. foll. §3771): "The indictment • • • shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The jurisdiction of the district court was invoked pursuant to the mail fraud statute (18 U. S. C. §1341) under which petitioner and another were indicted, tried and convicted after trial by jury on all counts of a ten count in-

dictment charging use of the mails to defraud (1a, 3a-8a*). Petitioner was sentenced to serve a year and a day on each count, the sentences to run concurrently, and fined $100 on each count (1a). Sentence was stayed pending appeal (2a).

Petitioner was employed as director of the moving picture department of Reynolds Metals Company (hereafter sometimes referred to as Reynolds) at its Louisville, Kentucky plant during the indictment period (10a). His duties were to produce films for promotional and public relations purposes (10a). In that connection he was authorized to requisition material and services through Reynolds' purchasing department.

The fraud charged was that petitioner and his co-defendant created an alleged musical scoring company (Cinema Scores Company) which invoiced Reynolds for musical scoring alleged to have been performed by Cinema Scores Company on films produced by petitioner, but which had actually been performed by other musical scoring companies under the direction of petitioner for amounts considerably less than the invoiced amounts (3a-9a). All invoices were prepared in Detroit, Michigan by petitioner who personally took them to Louisville (71a). All invoices were addressed to Reynolds at its Louisville, Kentucky plant (11a, 15a, 22a, 26a, 29a, 30a, 33a, 35a, 38a, 72a, 74a).

Each count of the indictment charged that petitioner and his co-defendant "for the purpose of executing the aforesaid scheme • • • placed or caused to be placed in an authorized depository for mail matter at Louisville, Kentucky, a letter addressed to Reynolds Metals Company, Richmond, Virginia, containing the aforesaid invoice • • •

*References are to pages of appendix to petitioner's brief in the Court of Appeals.

to be sent or delivered by the Post Office Establishment of the United States" (3a-9a). There was no proof that either defendant placed the invoices in the post office or an authorized depository for mail (71a-73a). During the cross-examination of petitioner at the trial he was interrogated concerning his knowledge of whether checks in payment of the invoices were mailed from Richmond to Cinema Scores Company in New York City. An objection that the indictment charged mailings only from Louisville to Richmond was overruled by the trial judge who stated in the presence of the jury "I don't think that's a fatal variance" (76a).

At the conclusion of the Government's proofs and again at the conclusion of the trial, petitioner moved for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, asserting, among other grounds, that since there was no evidence that either defendant placed the invoices in any post office or authorized depository, and since the indictment failed to charge that they had "knowingly" caused them to be delivered by mail, the indictment was fatally defective, and, under the proofs made, would not support a conviction (1a, 70a).

On the issue of mailing, the trial court charged the jury that "you must ask yourself • • • did these defendants use or cause the mails of the United States to be used in the furtherance of this scheme to defraud" (81a). After reading the second paragraph of the first charge (charging use of the mails), the trial court continued: "Now, it is not necessary • • • that the scheme to defraud was intended to be executed by the use of the mails. It is enough that the use of the mails could reasonably be contemplated and would follow in the ordinary course of business. Also, if the scheme is one which reasonably contemplated the use of the mails it is not necessary for the defendants to do

the mailing. It is sufficient if their acts caused the use of the mails by others in the usual course of business" (82a, 83a).

At the conclusion of the charge, the trial court asked counsel if there were any motions. Counsel for defendants requested the court to instruct the jury that they must find that the defendants actually mailed or caused the invoices to be mailed from Louisville to Richmond (as charged in the indictment) or acquit them. The trial court declined to so instruct, stating that "the words of the indictment charging only the use of the mail between Louisville and Richmond (are) superfluous and not an essential part of the charge" (84a). The trial court was also requested to instruct that defendants must have "knowingly" caused the mail to be used, but declined, stating "Well, I think my instructions regarding the mailing or causing to be mailed is from the most recent case of the United States Supreme Court, so I am going to adhere to that" (85a).*

The following occurred during the closing argument to the jury of the United States Attorney (79a):

> "Mr. Walker: • • • There's no question in my mind about the guilt of either one of these men. I say to you that they are guilty beyond all doubt. There's no guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; they are guilty beyond all doubt. All doubt. All doubt.
>
> "Mr. Field: If the Court please, I'd like to record an objection to the statement just made by the Government attorney.
>
> "The Court: All right.
>
> "Mr. Walker: And I say from the evidence that was presented here that was my deduction, and I do not believe that twelve intelligent women and men will be so gullible that they will believe what these

*The case referred to was *Pereira v. United States*, 347 U. S. 1.

defendants have said. I do not believe that you, in your own good conscience, could say these men were not guilty.

"Now, I could talk about more evidence in this case; more of my own deductions; but I feel that you now know as much about this case as anyone knows, and I ask you in good conscience, and from the bottom of my heart, with all my sincerity and honesty that I ever had to render a verdict quickly and swiftly of guilty as to both these defendants.

"Thank you."

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Petitioner contends (a) that the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision herein in conflict with the decisions of other Courts of Appeal on the same matter; (b) that the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be settled by this Court; and (c) that the Court of Appeals has so far sanctioned a departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision.

(a) In permitting the indictment to stand without the statutory word "knowingly" where there was no proof that either petitioner or his co-defendant placed the invoices in question in the post office or any authorized depository for mail matter, the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decisions of other Courts of Appeal on the same matter, viz.: the validity of an indictment failing to charge knowledge where the statute makes knowledge an element of the offense. *United States v. Max*, 3 Cir., 156 F. 2d 13; *United States v. Trypuc*, 2 Cir., 136 F. 2d 900.

Anderson v. United States, 6 Cir., 215 F. 2d 84, cited by the Court of Appeals in the order affirming the judgment of conviction herein (Appendix A) does not support the holding that the indictment was sufficient without the word "knowingly." In *Anderson* the defendants were charged with corruptly endeavoring to impede the administration of justice in a pending criminal case. The indictment followed the language of the statute (18 U. S. C. §1503) and was held sufficient, the court stating: "(t)he language of the indictment charging the offense is in strict conformity with the definition of the offense in the statute." Had the word "corruptly" been omitted from the indictment, the situation would have been analogous and in point. In that event the question would have been, as in the case at bar, whether the indictment charged the essential elements of a crime. Rule 7(c) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires that "(t)he indictment • • • shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged."

The controlling question in *Anderson* was not whether the indictment charged the essential elements of the crime as defined in the statute, but rather whether the particulars of the violation were sufficiently stated and *scienter* charged. The applicable statute did not make knowledge an element of the offense.* The Court of Appeals had no difficulty in finding that the indictment sufficiently apprised defendants of the particulars of their

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*Where a statute does not make intent or knowledge an element of a crime, it is clear that the indictment need not charge knowledge or intent. *Schultz v. United States*, 9 Cir., 155 F. 2d 721; *United States v. Amorosa*, 3 Cir., 167 F. 2d 596; see also bulletin published by the Department of Justice (Vol. I, May 27, 1946, No. 14) which states: "• • • Where the statute upon which the particular count is predicated makes wilfulness or knowledge an element of the offense, it is, of course, necessary to use the words 'wilfully' or 'knowingly.'"

offense and by fair implication imputed *scienter.* That was the controlling question in *Anderson.* It is not the question in the case at bar. The applicable rule is to be found in *Griffin v. United States,* 6 Cir., 173 F. 2d 909. There defendant had been convicted under a statute making it an offense for one *knowingly* to fail to possess a selective service registration certificate. The indictment under which defendant was convicted did not use the word "knowingly." The omission was held fatal.

(b) The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be settled by this Court.

By its decision, the Court of Appeals has in effect read the word "knowingly" out of the mail fraud statute. In reaching this result, the Court of Appeals has, it is submitted, misconceived the decision of this Court in *Pereira v. United States,* 347 U. S. 1. It is respectfully contended that the mail fraud statute may not be so construed as to eliminate therefrom the very element which creates the federal offense, to-wit: "knowingly" causing the mails to be used in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. Since knowledge is the gravamen of the federal offense, the indictment should have alleged knowledge, and the jury should have been charged, under the proofs, to find a knowing use of the mails or acquit.*

The point is by no means semantic, since the existence or absence of knowledge may spell the difference between a crime and an innocent act. For example, passing counterfeit money only becomes an offense where the person

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*It is doubtful, however, whether a good charge could have rescued the defective indictment. *Pullen v. United States,* 5 Cir., 164 F. 2d 756; *Sutton v. United States,* 5 Cir., 157 F. 2d 661.

passing it has knowledge that it is spurious (18 U. S. C. §472). In *Spurr v. United States,* 174 U. S. 728, this Court announced the rule that "an evil motive to accomplish that which the statute condemns becomes a constituent element of the crime." Existence of a *mens rea* is the rule rather than the exception to the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence. *Dennis v. United States,* 341 U. S. 494, 499, 500. This is particularly true under the mail fraud statute where it is the use of the mails that makes the offense a federal crime. *Kann v. United States,* 323 U. S. 88. Even before the 1948 amendment of the statute, it was held that a letter must have been knowingly mailed or caused to be mailed to constitute a violation of the statute. *Spillers v. United States,* 5 Cir., 47 F. 2d 893.

Reliance on *Pereira* is unwarranted. In that case Pereira deposited for collection checks drawn on a bank in California. The only question raised and passed upon was whether Pereira "caused" the checks to be mailed. This Court held that in depositing the checks for collection Pereira knew or could reasonably have foreseen that use of the mails would follow in the ordinary course of business. Whether it was necessary to charge and prove that he "knowingly" caused the mails to be used was not, as stated above, raised or passed on. See *United States v. Taylor,* 2 Cir., 217 F. 2d 397 at 399.

The question raised is one which has not been settled by this Court. It is submitted that it is an important one involving an essential provision of the mail fraud statute, the construction of which is necessary to a proper administration of the Act. Also involved is the sufficiency of the Official Form of indictment under the statute (18 U. S. C. pp. 2560, 2561, Form 3—Indictment for Mail Fraud).

18 U. S. C. §2 is not applicable as neither petitioner nor his co-defendant was shown to have placed the questioned invoices in any authorized depository for mail matter. Moreover, subparagraph (b) of this section of the statute was amended in 1951 by the addition of the word "wilfully" so as to read "(w)hoever wilfully causes an act to be done" etc.*

(c) The Court of Appeals has so far sanctioned a departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision.

Although the conduct of the United States Attorney in his closing argument to the jury was brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals at the oral argument and in the petition for rehearing, the matter was passed without mention in the order of affirmance.

It is submitted that the type of argument employed by the United States Attorney in the particulars mentioned was highly improper and prejudicial. For him to give the jury his personal opinion on the vital question of guilt or innocence, and in effect to exhort the jury to disregard the evidence, to waste no time on deliberation, and to render a verdict "quickly and swiftly" was incompatible with his responsibilities and duties as an official of the United States Government, and his obligation to discharge

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*As amended, the mail fraud statute appears to cover three situations so far as use of the mails is concerned: (1) Where an individual places a letter in the post office or in an authorized depository for mail matter. In this situation the statute does not require that knowledge be charged; (2) Where one of several individuals places such letter in the post office or authorized depository. Here all become principals and equally responsible for the mailing under 18 U. S. C. Sec. 2 (b); (3) Where there is no direct mailing but the individual causes such letter to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon. Here knowledge is an essential element of the offense.

his duties fairly and impartially. Assuring the jury of his personal conviction of the guilt of defendants, and pleading with the jury "from the bottom of my heart and with all my sincerity and honesty that I ever had, to render a verdict quickly and swiftly of guilty" may well have tipped the scales unfairly against petitioner and deprived him of that serious consideration of the factual issues by the jury which was his right under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

It is therefore submitted that this permitted departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings calls for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision. *Berger v. United States,* 295 U. S. 78, 88; *Viereck v. United States,* 318 U. S. 236, 248; *New York Central v. Johnson,* 279 U. S. 310, 316.

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that a writ of certiorari should be granted to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

Respectfully submited,

G. LESLIE FIELD,
415 Dime Building,
Detroit Michigan,
Attorney for Petitioner.

APPENDIX A

JUDGMENT

(Filed February 28, 1956)

This appeal from the district court's judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding appellant guilty upon a ten count indictment of using the mails to defraud in violation of 18 U. S. C. A., §1341, was heard on the record, briefs, and oral argument of counsel.

And it appearing that the essential facts constituting the offenses charged were sufficiently set out in the indictment, *Anderson v. United States,* 215 F. (2d) 84 (6 Cir., 1954); that there was substantial credible evidence to support the jury's verdict as to all elements of the offenses prohibited by the statute; and that in instructing the jury the district judge committed no error prejudicial to the appellant, *Pereira v. United States,* 347 U. S. 1 (1954);

It Is Ordered that the judgment of the district court be and it hereby is affirmed.

APPENDIX B

TITLE 18, U. S. C., SECTION 1341— FRAUDS AND SWINDLES

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Post Office Department, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, §1, 62 Stat. 763; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §34, 63 Stat. 94.)

INDEX

	Page
Opinion below	1
Jurisdiction	1
Statute and rule involved	2
Questions presented	3
Statement	3
Argument	8
Conclusion	11

CITATIONS

Cases:

Gridley v. *United States*, 44 F. 2d 716 (C.A. 6), certiorari denied, 283 U.S. 827	10
Griffin v. *United States*, 173 F. 2d 909	8
Henderson v. *United States*, 218 F. 2d 14	10
Kann v. *United States*, 323 U.S. 88	8
Krueter v. *United States*, 218 F. 2d 532, 533-534 (C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 349 U.S. 932	9
Pereira v. *United States*, 347 U.S. 1	8
United States v. *Battiato*, 204 F. 2d 717, 719 (C.A. 7), certiorari denied, 346 U.S. 871	10
United States v. *Crummer*, 151 F. 2d 958, 963 (C.A. 10), certiorari denied, 327 U.S. 785	9
United States v. *Debrow*, 346 U.S. 374	9
United States v. *Holt*, 108 F. 2d 365, 370 (C.A. 7), certiorari denied, 309 U.S. 672	10
United States v. *Max*, 156 F. 2d 13	9
Webb v. *United States*, 191 F. 2d 512	8–9

Statute and Rule Involved:

18 U.S.C. 1341	2, 3
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 7(c)	2–3, 9

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1955

No. 905

LEONARD J. SHAFITZ, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The *per curiam* opinion of the Court of Appeals (Pet. App. 1a) is reported at 230 F. 2d 606.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on February 28, 1956 (Pet. App. 1a). A petition for a rehearing was denied on March 30, 1956. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on April 27, 1956. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1)

STATUTE AND RULE INVOLVED

18 U.S.C. 1341 provides:

> Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Post Office Department, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

> The indictment * * * shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.

* * * It need not contain * * * any other matter not necessary to such statement.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether an indictment under the mail fraud statute (18 U.S.C. 1341) was fatally defective in omitting the word "knowingly" in charging that petitioner "placed or caused to be placed" in the mails certain fraudulent invoices.

2. Whether the prosecutor's statement that from the evidence he believed in petitioner's guilt constituted reversible error.

STATEMENT

Petitioner and one Lowen were charged in a ten-count indictment in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky with violations of 18 U.S.C. 1341 (*supra*, p. 2), in that they devised a scheme to defraud Reynolds Metal Company (hereinafter referred to as Reynolds) by knowingly making false invoices to the effect that Cinema Scores Company, set up by the two defendants, had performed certain services for Reynolds in connection with motion picture production for which Reynolds was indebted to Cinema Scores. In each count it was alleged that on the particular date in 1952 involved, petitioner and Lowen, for the purpose of executing the scheme, "placed or caused to be placed in an authorized depository for mail matter, at Louisville, Kentucky, a letter addressed to Reynolds Metal Company, Richmond, Virginia, containing the aforesaid invoice of Cinema Scores Company * * *

for the purpose of securing payment thereof, to be sent or delivered by the Post Office Establishment of the United States" (R. 3a-8a).[1] Petitioner was found guilty by a jury, and on appeal his conviction was unanimously affirmed (Pet. 1a).

The evidence adduced at the trial may be summarized briefly as follows:

Petitioner was the director of the Reynolds Motion Picture Department for the preparation of commercial films. His office was at Louisville, Kentucky, where he also had a business of his own called Cinema Products Company (R. 10a, 13a, 35b). Lowen, who lived in Detroit, was registered in New York and Detroit to do business under the name Cinema Scores Company (R. 2b-4b).

Lowen testified that the Cinema Scores Company invoices submitted to Reynolds were prepared by petitioner in Detroit at Lowen's home. Petitioner would discuss with Lowen the various films he was working on, and prepare invoices for the work he felt was completed or nearing completion (R. 61b-62b).

At Louisville, petitioner would make a requisition for the work to be done and approve the invoice, which would go to a clerk, Mrs. Ryles (R. 11a, 14a, 15a, 85b-87b, 94b, 103b-104b). The invoice would be approved for payment by a supervisor, and Mrs. Ryles would prepare transmittal papers, which were picked up by an employee from the

[1] The record is composed in part of the Appellant's Appendix, paginated 1a to 86a, inclusive, and the Appellee's Appendix, paginated 1b to 109b, inclusive.

mailing department and mailed to the Richmond office for payment (R. 14a-18a, 84b, 88b-93b, 97b-102b). At Richmond, a check would be drawn and mailed to the Cinema Scores Company in New York (R. 48a, 51a-53a, 105b, 107b). Such checks were indorsed for deposit to the "account of Cinema Scores Co., Leslie Lowen" (R. 105b, 107b).

The total amount of checks received from Reynolds by Cinema Scores Company between 1950 and 1953 was $22,247 (R. 65b). Cinema Scores Company had no facilities for scoring films (R. 54b, 82b). Lowen and petitioner testified that when Reynolds forwarded a requisition to Cinema Scores for certain services, they performed consultative and research services without any necessity for physical assets (R. 54b-55b, 82b-83b). Nearly all of the alleged services on the invoices had already been performed by legitimate companies, and none by Cinema Scores Company (R. 7b-13b, 22b-34b, 43b-49b).

Lowen testified that the only reason for the New York address of Cinema Scores Company was to receive checks from Reynolds (R. 54b). He sent part of the proceeds from the Reynolds checks to petitioner, after petitioner's Cinema Products Company billed Cinema Scores for services (R. 56b-59b).

At the close of the government's case and at the conclusion of the trial, petitioner made a motion for acquittal. Among the reasons assigned were that there was no evidence that either defendant placed invoices in any post office, and that the in-

dictment was fatally defective in failing to charge that the defendants knowingly caused the invoices to be mailed (R.1a, 70a).

In closing argument, the prosecutor, Mr. Walker, attacked petitioner's credibility. He stated that petitioner knew that the invoices would be mailed to Richmond, and that checks in payment of the invoices would go through the mails (R. 77a-79a). The following then occurred (R. 79a):

> Mr. WALKER: * * * There's no question in my mind about the guilt of either one of these men. I say to you that they are guilty beyond all doubt. There's no guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; they are guilty beyond all doubt. All doubt. All doubt.
>
> Mr. FIELD: If the Court please, I'd like to record an objection to the statement just made by the Government attorney.
>
> The COURT: All right.
>
> Mr. WALKER: And I say from the evidence that was presented here that was my deduction, and I do not believe that twelve intelligent women and men will be so gullible that they will believe what these defendants have said. I do not believe that you, in your own good conscience, would say these men were not guilty.
>
> Now, I could talk about more evidence in this case, more of my own deductions; but I feel that you now know as much about this case as anyone knows, and I ask you in good conscience, and from the bottom of my heart, with all my sincerity and honesty that I ever had to

render a verdict quickly and swiftly of guilty as to both of these defendants.

Thank you.

The court charged the jury as follows:

> There are two principal questions for you members of the jury to ask yourselves; first * * * whether or not these defendants devised a scheme to defraud Reynolds Metal Company as is charged in the first paragraph of each of the separate counts of this indictment; and second, * * * did these defendants use or cause the mails of the United States to be used in the furtherance of this scheme to defraud. * * * (R. 81a).
>
> * * * * *
>
> Now it is not necessary * * * that the scheme to defraud was intended to be executed by the use of the mails. It is enough that the use of the mails could reasonably be contemplated and would follow in the ordinary course of business. Also, if the scheme is one which reasonably contemplated the use of the mails, it is not necessary for the defendants to do the mailing. It is sufficient if their acts caused the use of the mails by others in the usual course of business (R. 82a-83a).

Defense counsel requested an instruction that the defendants must have "knowingly" caused the mails to be used. In answer to this the court said:

"Well, I think my instructions regarding the mailing or causing to be mailed is from the most recent case of the United States Supreme Court [*Pereira* v. *United States*, 347 U.S. 1], so I am going to adhere to that" (R. 84a-85a).

ARGUMENT

1. Petitioner's contention that the indictment was fatally defective, in that it did not use the word "knowingly" in charging that he "placed or caused to be placed" in the mails the invoices involved, is without merit.

The concept of causation embraces the element of knowledge. The use of the mails is "caused" if, as the trial judge charged, such use is within the reasonable contemplation of the scheme, *Pereira* v. *United States*, 347 U.S. 1, 12; *Kann* v. *United States*, 323 U.S. 88, 94, *i.e.*, if the schemer has reason to know that the mails will be used in furtherance of the scheme. There was thus no reason to allege that the mailing was knowingly caused. The indictment did allege that the fraud was knowingly perpetrated since petitioner and Lowen were charged with devising the fraudulent scheme to represent that Cinema Scores Company had performed services for Reynolds, "well *knowing* at the time and place that the pretenses and representation, would be false when made" (emphasis added; R. 3a).[2] See *Webb* v. *United States*,

[2] That fact serves to distinguish the cases relied upon by petitioner where the offense itself was not alleged to have been knowingly done. *Griffin* v. *United States*, 173 F. 2d 909 (C.A.

191 F. 2d 512, 514-515 (C.A. 10); *Kreuter* v. *United States*, 218 F. 2d 532, 533-534 (C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 349 U.S. 932; and *United States v. Crummer*, 151 F. 2d 958, 963 (C.A. 10), certiorari denied, 327 U.S. 785, in which mail fraud indictments, not using the word "knowingly", were upheld.

Modern rules of pleading do not require that evidentiary facts be pleaded in detail or with hair-splitting precision. It suffices that the indictment contain "a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged" (Rule 7(c), F. R. Crim. P., *supra*, pp. 2-3), as this indictment did. The various counts apprised petitioner and his co-defendant "of that with which they were accused, so as to enable them to prepare their defense and to plead the judgment in bar of any further prosecutions for the same offense." *United States* v. *Debrow*, 346 U.S. 374, 378.

Petitioner has shown no prejudice flowing from omission of the word "knowingly" from the indictment. There was evidence that invoices representing accounts payable by Reynolds at Louisville were paid by its disbursing office at Richmond (R. 12a, 48a, 51a-52a). On petitioner's cross-examination, moreover, it was shown that on several occasions he had interdepartmental correspondence with Reynolds employees at the disbursing office in Richmond, so that he had knowledge that the disbursement office was located there (R. 72b-77b,

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6), involving a selective service violation, and *United States* v. *Max*, 156 F. 2d 13 (C.A. 3), involving a violation of an O.P.A. order.

109b). Petitioner also testified that he expected the checks to be paid to Cinema Scores Company from "wherever the Disbursing Office of the Reynolds Metals Company would be, Louisville, Richmond, or wherever it may be" (R. 79b). There was, therefore, ample evidence from which the jury could infer that petitioner had knowingly caused the mailing of the invoices.

2. There is no substance to petitioner's contention that the prosecutor's closing argument, in expressing an opinion as to petitioner's guilt and asking for the return of a guilty verdict "quickly and swiftly" (Statement, *supra*, pp. 6-7), was prejudicially improper (Pet. 12-13).

A prosecutor may ask for a conviction, and exhort the jury to draw all reasonable inferences and deductions from the evidence. It is not misconduct for him to express individual belief as to an accused's guilt if this is based solely upon the evidence introduced, and the jury is not led to believe that there is other evidence, known to the prosecutor but not introduced, warranting that belief. *Henderson* v. *United States*, 218 F. 2d 14, 19 (C.A. 6); *United States* v. *Battiato*, 204 F. 2d 717, 719 (C.A. 7), certiorari denied, 346 U.S. 871; *United States* v. *Holt*, 108 F. 2d 365, 370 (C.A. 7), certiorari denied, 309 U.S. 672; *Gridley* v. *United States*, 44 F. 2d 716, 739 (C.A. 6), certiorari denied, 283 U.S. 827.

Here the prosecutor based his statement on the evidence. He had attacked petitioner's credibility by showing the untenability of his testimony that

he did not even know there was a Reynolds disbursing office in Richmond, when all his salary checks had come from there; and by showing the implausibility of petitioner's original denial (later retracted) that he knew anything of a disbursing officer named Grubbs at Richmond (R. 78a). Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor made the remarks now claimed to have been objectionable (R. 79a). He stated that his belief as to petitioner's guilt was his own "deduction" from the evidence as presented; it was not a personal opinion based upon evidence known only to him, but not introduced at the trial. In this setting it was no more prejudicial than the facts themselves.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the court below is in accordance with established legal principles, and there is no conflict of decisions. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

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MAY 1956.

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1956 594259 1492